Simon Lee: The Supremes’ Seventh: Dominant or Diminished?

Seven points about the Supreme Court judgment in Miller II/Cherry are in danger of being missed amidst the political noise. The tone of our reception of the Justices’ seventh paragraph, in particular, could determine whether there is any way of finding constitutional harmony in our democracy.

First, Tuesday’s summary of the unanimous, unambiguous, unequivocal and powerful judgment of the UK Supreme Court was delivered by Lady Hale, President, in authoritative tones and simple language, rather like Chief Justice Earl Warren crafted a unanimous, simple and radical judgment of the US Supreme Court in its 1954 case on racial desegregation in education, Brown v Board of Education. It was all the better because we could see and hear her succinct explanation. The full written judgment was by Lady Hale and Lord Reed, the Deputy President and soon to be her successor as President, on behalf of the Court. These two were on opposite sides in the 8-3 split ruling in Miller I. It is a major achievement of the leadership of the Court to have brought 11 Justices together in such plain language.

Second, there was not one single mention of ‘the rule of law’ in the 73 paragraph judgment, despite one of the greatest judges of the post-War era, Lord Bingham, having written a whole book about it and many people invoking it as the underlying message of the judgment, as one of the successful litigants, Gina Miller, did outside the Court. The concept is profound but its use has become glib and it was time to set out the gist in different language.

Third, in addition to the sovereignty of Parliament, we had instead a second principle of the constitution which Lady Hale described as ‘Parliamentary accountability’.

Fourth, in explaining this, she cited Lord Carnwath’s dissent in Miller I with approval. I had asked Lady Hale about it at the Society of Legal Scholars conference earlier this month. In the first Miller case on Brexit, heard in the UK Supreme Court on 5-8 December 2016 with judgments given on 24 January 2017 (which seemed swift at the time but, by the standards of September 2019, seems rather slow), the majority eight Justices, including Lady Hale, agreed that, referring to a notice of withdrawal from the European Union under Article 50, ‘As Lord Pannick QC put it for Mrs Miller, when ministers give Notice they will be “pulling…the trigger which causes the bullet to be fired, with the consequence that the bullet will hit the target and the Treaties will cease to apply”.’ Lord Carnwath’s dissenting view was that ‘Lord Pannick’s trigger/bullet analogy is superficially attractive, but (with respect) fallacious. A real bullet does not take two years to reach its target. Nor is its progress accompanied by an intense period of negotiations over the form of protection that should be available to the victim by the time it arrives.’ Nor, we might now add, is the target given an extension. The Court of Justice of the European Union later ruled in Wightman in December 2018 that Article 50 could be unilaterally revocable by a government which had given notice. In other words, the assumption accepted by all involved in the Miller case was based on a misunderstanding. In Miller II/Cherry, the Supreme Court did not spell out that Lord Carnwath was dissenting or that Wightman confirmed that the premise of Miller I was wrong. This time, though, there was no reliance on analogy or metaphor. Straightforward setting out of the facts and the Justices’ understanding of the constitution could prove more explosive than putting a gun in the hands of one Prime Minister when it comes to putting a gun, so to speak, to the head of the next.

Fifth, there was no mention of any of the blog posts or other articles produced by academic lawyers, although they influenced counsels’ arguments and therefore the judges. The only academic cited was, via an earlier Law Lord’s judgment, Sir William Wade, for the 7th edition of Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law. When I reviewed the 5th edition for the Law Quarterly Review, I observed that, ‘Wade likes judges. Judges like Wade.’ In a constitution otherwise in flux, those twin fundamental truths still hold and remain conjoined.

Sixth, whereas I wrote Judging Judges in the 1980s partly to point out the flaws in the default position of the Left, which was to berate the judges for being conservative and Conservative, and to call for a more nuanced analysis, the Labour Party conference now gave the news of the Supreme Court’s judgment a standing ovation.

Seventh, the government and/or Brexiteers and/or reluctant Leavers seem to have missed the one passage which might help them in their disputes with those they dub ‘Remoaners’. In paragraph 7, the Court states that, ‘As everyone knows, a referendum was held (pursuant to the European Union Referendum Act 2015) on 23rd June 2016. The majority of those voting voted to leave the European Union. Technically, the result was not legally binding. But the Government had pledged to honour the result and it has since been treated as politically and democratically binding. Successive Governments and Parliament have acted on that basis …’ The Prime Minister might ask the leaders of other parties and other opponents if they agree with the Court that the result of the referendum is ‘politically and democratically binding’. But he should not be allowed by his political opponents or supporters or the media or the rest of us to get away with pitting the People, by which he means those who won the 2016 referendum, against the Establishment including the Supreme Court, when the Justices have explicitly elevated the result of that referendum into something which is ‘politically and democratically binding’.

As I argued in The Times this summer, Lord Sumption’s Reith Lectures on Law and the Decline of Politics were misconceived: ‘democracy should not be reduced to a choice of law or politics. If we must specify the law’s distinctive contribution to democracy, however, its authority is rooted in independent judges giving reasons, having heard the best arguments on all sides of a dispute … Our constitutional story over centuries is not so much about Law and the Decline of Parliament as about Law and the Incline of Reason.’ In setting out their reasoning with such clarity and harmony, and in highlighting the absence of reasoned argument from the Prime Minister, the Supreme Court Justices have set a new tone for public debate.

Simon Lee (@paradoxbridge) is Professor of Law, The Open University, Emeritus Professor of Jurisprudence, Queen’s University Belfast, and the author of Judging Judges (Faber, 1988).

(Suggested citation: S. Lee, ‘The Supremes’ Seventh: Dominant or Diminished?’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (26th Sept. 2019) (available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/))

Comments

8 responses to “Simon Lee: The Supremes’ Seventh: Dominant or Diminished?”

  1. Roger Avatar
    Roger

    It is an Establishment stitch up.

    To talk of Parliamentary accountability is rubbing salt into the wounds of our severely injured democracy.

    If there is one thing lacking here it is accountability of Parliament to the people. When they fail the people, and then unaccountable judges side with MPs who are failing the country, we might as well be in the EUSSR. Oh dear, we are.

    Why were we asked if we wanted to be free for our decision only to be ignored, and worse manipulated by these establishment anti-democratic bullies?

    The judges are not accountable and have no right interfering with those who are. That is the top and bottom of it. The rest is irrelevant floss.

    They are a unanimous disgrace.

  2. Grumpole Avatar
    Grumpole

    All the legalese, jargon and highbrow waffle cannot hide the fact that Parliament, judiciary and the establishment on taking any office owe their allegiance to the EU not the UK, this is EU law not ours. No matter what the people want until we elect MPs who will honour the peoples will we will always be chained to the EU.

  3. Tom Murphy Avatar
    Tom Murphy

    The Supreme Court has not explicitly elevated the result of the referendum into something which is “politically and democratically binding”.

    The words used were
    “the Government had pledged to honour the result and it has since been treated as politically and democratically binding”.

    How one treats a thing does not alter the essential nature of the thing. I could treat my pet dog as if she was a horse, but she would still be a dog. Treating the referendum result as if it was binding does not make it binding.

    Furthermore, how a particular government chooses to treat it does not oblige parliament to treat it in that way. The question of whether or not Parliament “agree with the Court that the result of the referendum is politically and democratically binding” does not arise because the Court did not say that it was, they only said that the Government is treating it as if it was.

    1. Roget Avatar
      Roget

      If you think the govt can treat the referendum as not binding there are 17,400,000 people to correct you. Let the govt try to use your arguments to not deliver Brexit and watch what happens. It’s binding for all practical and political purposes.

      1. Tom Murphy Avatar
        Tom Murphy

        Firstly, my comment was not about how the government may or may not choose the treat the referendum result, it was taking issue with the original post’s assertion that the Supreme Court had “elevated” the result of the referendum to something that was politically and democratically binding. The words of the judgement contradict that assertion and I note that it have now been removed from the post.

        Secondly, it is not for any of the people who voted leave to “correct” me, the government or anybody else about anything.

        Thirdly, I remind you that the government has acted unlawfully in an attempt to prevent Parliamentary oversight of its attempt to achieve brexit.

        Fourthly, I remind you that brexit did not take place on 29th March and did not take place on 12th April, and I remind you of what happened after those dates. Nothing happened.

      2. Roger Avatar
        Roger

        When you get something wrong you need correcting. Same for everyone. The referendum is politically binding, no such vote could be more binding under the existing UK system than that one.

        Thanks for your reminders. One for you: there has been no GE since the failure to leave. When politicians either stop quaking in their boots long enough or they’re obliged to hold one we will see what the people make of their anti-democratic actions.

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