Alex Green: Our Constitution, Accountability and the Limits of the Power to Prorogue

Constitutions do many things. They distribute authority amongst public bodies, enshrine important points of substantive principle, and cement relationships between rulers and the ruled. However, in a more abstract and fundamental sense, constitutions also tell us something about ourselves as political collectives: they express the kind of polity we embody and the kind of people we have come to be.

Whether written or unwritten, constitutions establish the contours of our political communities. To use Hannah Arendt’s metaphor – borrowed from the Ancient Greek understanding of law as nomos – constitutions are the walls that encircle, define, and defend the everyday aspects of our political lives. It is against this normative backdrop that I want to reflect upon one element of what is expressed by the recent judgement of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in the cases of R (on the application of Miller) v The Prime Minister and Cherry and others v Advocate General for Scotland. This element, which I contend is of fundamental importance to the overall justifiability of our constitutional order, is mentioned in paragraphs 46 and 47 of that judgement. It relates to the governmental accountability, and is expressed in the following terms:

Ministers are accountable to Parliament through such mechanisms as their duty to answer Parliamentary questions and to appear before Parliamentary committees, and through Parliamentary scrutiny of the delegated legislation which ministers make. By these means, the policies of the executive are subjected to consideration by the representatives of the electorate, the executive is required to report, explain and defend its actions, and citizens are protected from the arbitrary exercise of executive power.

Her Majesty’s most recent prorogation of Parliament, now declared void (see paragraph 70), was to last for the unusually long duration of five weeks. Prior to that prorogation, one may have forgivably considered it trite that, as a matter of moral and constitutional principle, government policy should be ‘subjected to consideration by the representatives of the electorate’. However, as the Supreme Court makes clear at paragraph 56 of their decision, the Prime Minister’s advice to prorogue had the effect of completely forestalling this mode of accountability. This goes to show that even the most trite points of constitutional principle can be subject to unforeseen precarity.

Perhaps of even greater constitutional interest, the court held at paragraph 61 that the advice to prorogue was unjustified, and therefore unlawful. The formulation of the test employed to reach that conclusion is worth reproducing in full (at paragraph 50):

For the purposes of the present case, therefore, the relevant limit upon the power to prorogue can be expressed in this way: that a decision to prorogue Parliament (or to advise the monarch to prorogue Parliament) will be unlawful if the prorogation has the effect of frustrating or preventing, without reasonable justification, the ability of Parliament to carry out its constitutional functions as a legislature and as the body responsible for the supervision of the executive. In such a situation, the court will intervene if the effect is sufficiently serious to justify such an exceptional course.

Even placing to one side what this paragraph has to say about the role of legislation, it encapsulates at least two important moral and legal propositions: 1) Parliamentary representatives must be allowed to hold the executive to account; and 2) the courts should intervene if, absent justification, the prerogative power to prorogue is used to forestall this holding to account.

I have no doubt that some lawyers, whether acting for the government or in a private academic capacity, will hereafter spill much ink in their attempts to limit the implications of this ruling. The Supreme Court themselves have certainly paved the way for such legal cautionaries: the Court’s emphasis on the unusual circumstances of this prorogation, and their optimistic prediction (at paragraph 1) that nothing of this sort is ever likely to occur again, signals quite strongly that they intend to speak only to the instant case, and not beyond.

Nonetheless, I suggest that this important judgement expresses far more than a narrow, technical ruling on the power to prorogue; more even than a new approach to judicial oversight of prerogative powers in general. It expresses, or so I shall argue, a rallying cry for a bold constitutional vision of the United Kingdom: the vision of a polity that takes seriously the individual agency of its citizen-subjects. To explain what I have in mind, it is necessary to reflect upon the value of accountability.

Governmental Accountability

Representation, whether within the legislative or executive branches of government, matters, at least in part, because it establishes the accountability of those who wield power to those subject to it. In particular, the periodic removal or confirmation of our representatives lessens the possibility of persistently unpopular rule, provides a potential means for preventing tyranny, and facilitates the removal of demonstrably incompetent governments. The framers of the United States Constitution recognised this, understanding the people ‘not as rulers, but as judges able to check the legislature’.

These practical points are well rehearsed. In this post, I want to emphasise something slightly more esoteric, but no less important: accountable government also reflects an important element of respect for individual personhood. Insofar as governments accept accountability to the governed, they acknowledge that the interests of those individuals are implicated when public power is exercised. This facilitates the agency of individuals subject to political power and avoids treating them as mere objects or bearers of externalities. Such governments begin to take their subjects seriously as individuals, rather than as ‘human resources’ to further their own ends. This is an important element of the respect that our rulers owe to us, morally speaking. When governmental accountability is stymied this respect is abrogated and disrespect takes its place.

Prorogation and Accountability

As I argued in a previous piece, the degree of respect that accountability expresses depends upon the manner in which it is instituted. When the available mechanisms for accountability are relatively few and ineffective, the respect expressed by their existence will be purely nominal. For instance, whilst instrumentally important in many respects, the power to deny reappointment to our legislative representatives provides relatively minimal accountability, especially where it is infrequently and irregularly available. Prior to the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, general elections were held when the government deemed it appropriate, subject to some constitutional conventions, such as the rule that elections must be held before the new parliamentary term. Nonetheless, the executive determined when popular accountability could be exercised. No system of representation under which the accountable exercise such control over the means of their accountability can demonstrate more than a pale, thin conception of what is owed to the governed.

In the contemporary context, it must be remembered that private individuals in the United Kingdom have relatively few effective means for holding their government directly to account, at least where they are not personally affected by executive decision making. It is partly for this reason that Members of Parliament can be contacted directly by their constituents, so that the former may raise issues on their behalf. Furthermore, it is only over individual Members of Parliament – and not over the government as such – that private individuals hold, collectively, the power to deny reappointment. This was explicitly recognised by the Supreme Court, who at paragraph 55 of their judgement stated:

The House of Commons exists because the people have elected its members. The Government is not directly elected by the people (unlike the position in some other democracies). The Government exists because it has the confidence of the House of Commons. It has no democratic legitimacy other than that.

Given this constitutional background, the continued oversight of Parliament, the members of which are directly accountable in more than one manner, is of fundamental moral importance. As noted in paragraph 46 of the Court’s judgement, Parliament enables crucial debate over, and scrutiny of, executive action ‘through such mechanisms as…[each minister’s] duty to answer Parliamentary questions and to appear before Parliamentary committees, and through Parliamentary scrutiny of the delegated legislation which ministers make’. Given the extent of popular dependence upon Parliament as an accountability mechanism, to stymie its oversight of the executive is to hamstring popular oversight itself, with all the incidental disadvantages that entails and all the disrespect for individual agency it implies. Nothing, or so I argue, could be further from the spirit of British democracy.

Conclusion: Two Visions of the British Constitution

In his first speech as Prime Minister, Boris Johnson stated that:

Everyone knows the values that flag [sic] represents.

It stands for freedom and free speech and habeas corpus and the rule of law, and above all it stands for democracy.

And that is why we will come out of the EU on October 31.

Because in the end, Brexit was a fundamental decision by the British people that they wanted their laws made by people that they can elect and they can remove from office.

And we must now respect that decision…

Following his advice to prorogue Parliament, it is somewhat unclear what conception of democracy the Prime Minister had in mind when he gave that speech. Those of us who doubt that any genuine concern for representative government underlies Mr Johnson’s premiership will find some confirmation for our scepticism in paragraph 61 of the Supreme Court’s judgement, which states that it was ‘impossible for us to conclude…that there was any reason – let alone a good reason – to advise Her Majesty to prorogue Parliament for five weeks’. Let me suggest an interpretation, not only for the content of his first speech, but for the recent unlawful prorogation as well: for the Prime Minister, democracy means populist demagoguery; a strong leader pushing through a snapshot of popular opinion.

By contrast, the judgement of the Supreme Court in Miller and Cherry expresses a different conception: one more firmly rooted in our Parliamentary tradition. It recognises that democracy does not proceed on the basis of untrammelled executive fiat, guided obliquely by occasional opinion polls. Instead, it sees representative government as an ongoing collective venture. On this view, private individuals must have multiple and frequent opportunities to participate in the governance of their communities. What matters is not just that they have their say, as it were, every now and then. Instead, they must always have at least some means of holding government to account: through Parliament in the first instance, and then, if necessary, through the courts. As I have tried to show here, this second view has considerable moral appeal. Not only does it facilitate a constant check against the emergence of tyranny, but it also respects the agency of each individual subject. The Supreme Court should be applauded for standing in defence of these values.

Alex Green, Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Hong Kong

(Suggested citaton: A. Green, ‘Our Constitution, Accountability and the Limits of the Power to Prorogue’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (26th Sept. 2019) (available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/))

Comments

13 responses to “Alex Green: Our Constitution, Accountability and the Limits of the Power to Prorogue”

  1. Roger Avatar
    Roger

    Unaccountable unelected judges have no business interfering with those who are.

    Very simple.

    Establishment interference of the very worst kind, dressed up in a tissue of claptrap.

    If we can be free of the EUSSR (have you heard Verhofstadt? No mention of mandate or the people, a plebiscite, or similar, they want to rule all European nations without accountability, but like our judges) there will need to be fundamental substantial change across the establishment. It has been exposed as self-interested and uninterested in the people.

    1. Alex Green Avatar
      Alex Green

      Thank you for your comment Roger. With respect, it cannot be true that judges have no business at all ‘interfering’ with elected officials, if that means that they should not hold them to legal account. If that were the case, then the government could not be subject to judicial constraint at all. This flies completely in the face of the rule of law. Furthermore, the PM himself was not elected to his role, neither was any member of his cabinet. Finally, if the law on prorogation was interpreted in the way the government suggested it should, then they would have been granted the means to remain completely unaccountable for an indefinite period of time. If you truly believe in the importance of elected and accountable officials you should be very much in favour of the UKSC decision.

      1. Roger Avatar
        Roger

        The PM carried out a normal activity, nothing for the judiciary to interfere with. It’s a political activity and not illegal normally. Allowing for party conferences, the period was not unduly excessive. They interfered in a political activity, controlled by the voting electorate, which admittedly needs strengthening to make it more effective.

        As for unelected, Boris is the elected leader of a party elected to govern with a mandate to leave the EU, and fulfils the normal requirements to hold power. The judges have no such authority.

        That it was a unanimously agreed decision just sets off alarm bells on collusive behaviour. Unjustified political interference writ large. The establishment has no shame in its anti-democratic wrangling to avoid Brexit. The establishment does not care about the people, and is working against them instead of doing all it can to facilitate their decision. The smug self-satisfied expressions while delivering their shocking judgement do nothing to reassure people of their true purpose.

        I reject your criticism.

  2. Paul McH Avatar
    Paul McH

    This is very pedantic but it makes my teeth itch when I see it written as ‘judgement’.

    The author seems to suggest in the Conclusion that Johnson was wrong in his (apparent) affinity to direct democracy as opposed to the pure representative democracy espoused in the judgment.

    But let us remember at paragraph 57: ” A fundamental change was due to take place in the
    Constitution of the United Kingdom on 31st October 2019. Whether or not this is a
    good thing is not for this or any other court to judge. The people have decided that.”

    The Court, rightly, recognises that the quaint Burkean notion lapses somewhat when a decision has been delegated to the electorate via direct democracy.

    1. Alex Green Avatar
      Alex Green

      Thanks for your comment Paul. I do indeed argue that the PM was wrong to do what he did and that his understanding of democracy is impoverished. However, it does not follow that representative democracy needs to forestall direct popular engagement – far from it.

      The point, I think, is that this need not, and certainly should not, be a zero sum game. The referendum should be taken seriously, insofar as it was conducted in an appropriate manner: I argued as much in an earlier post (https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/07/14/alex-green-why-the-eu-referendum-might-be-morally-binding-a-partial-response-to-yossi-nehushtan/). However, its moral weight cannot justify the removal of representative accountability mechanisms. That was Johnson’s mistake: he supposes that he is somehow justified in sidestepping one important aspect of democracy in favour of another.

      Also, I hope your teeth accept my apology.

      1. Baron Ash Avatar
        Baron Ash

        “cannot justify the removal of representative accountability mechanisms..”

        Nor should the Court have stepped in after the House refused to use one of those mechanisms, namely a VONC. For some reason you keep ignoring this important little detail.

        Perhaps because, like the SC, acknowledging means they should have rapidly quashed the appeal since it entirely lacked any valid Cause of Action. No harm to Parliament was done by the prorogation which gave them ample time to get around it. They had time for the Benn Surrender Bill. They had time for a VONC. The prorogation did not go until November 1st, but only until October 14th.

        The Courts have been used to step into the political arena.
        The sad – and disturbing fact – is that they surely relished it.

        Hopefully, they will be set straight by Parliamentary Law in the next session.

  3. Baron Ash Avatar
    Baron Ash

    Nicely constructed article, but verbiage nonetheless. All this elegant nattering on about ‘accountability’ ignores – just like the Justices assiduously (and disgracefully) did – that the prime accountability of the Executive is to the Parliament, who are the elected representatives of the people. If the Parliament felt that prorogation was unreasonable, they could have called a vote of No Confidence. They were warmly invited to do so, but even though they can command a majority (Exhibit 1 the ridiculous Benn’s Surrender Bill), they chose not to do so.

    They had their remedy. They didn’t want it.
    The Court should have rapidly dismissed the case as being without merit.

    Hopefully, that Court will soon be disbanded.
    If not, then the next Parliament should pass an Act prohibiting it from interfering in such matters.

    I pray the Gov can resuscitate some statute-backed Law from somewhere giving them the lawful ability to strike down or nullify that Benn business. Judging from BJ’s language, it seems they have something like that up their sleeve. After all the rule-bending shenanigans of this nakedly biased Speaker and Remainer Parliament, it’s about time the Brexit side struck back.

    I hope they will rue the day they refused a General Election for the mendacious reason that they ‘couldn’t trust Boris’ to set the date. They could have written a simple Bill to fix it. (And they go on and on about BJ being such a liar, and his language being so inflammatory…. talk about pot calling kettle black..)

    1. Alex Green Avatar
      Alex Green

      Thank you for your comments Ash. If you will tolerate my nattering verbiage a bit longer, there are elements of my argument you seem to have misunderstood. I agree that Parliament could (and should) have exercised its power to hold a vote of no confidence, however it has not as yet.

      However, it would be wrong to conflate the importance of Parliament being in session, and therefore able to hold the government to account, and its failure (or otherwise) to exercise its oversight powers in a particular manner – in this case by not holding a vote of no confidence.

      It matters just that Parliament is not removed for no good reason: that it has the potential to exercise whatever oversight functions it deems appropriate. This potential for accountability expresses much of the respect I was talking about and the forestalling of that completely via prorogation encapsulates much of the relevant disrespect.

      Furthermore, the relevant harm was not done to Parliament but to the populace, who have a moral and legal right to be appropriately represented on an ongoing basis.

      Finally, it must be remembered that Parliament may have a number of reasons for not holding a vote of no confidence at any particular point, although personally I think that one is indeed overdue. What matters, to reiterate, is that they have the potential to do so. Parliament cannot undertake motions of any kind when it is prorogued.

      1. Baron Ash Avatar
        Baron Ash

        “Furthermore, the relevant harm was not done to Parliament but to the populace, who have a moral and legal right to be appropriately represented on an ongoing basis.”

        With respect, that is a specious argument. Parliament IS the people, essentially. And also it’s a weak argument against the fact that if Parliament didn’t like prorogation they could have forestalled it. They chose not to exercise that option and did a run around to a clearly pro-Establishment Court.

        The main point is that Pariament had a remedy for any harm from prorogation and chose not to exercise it. The Supreme Court had no business adjudicating the case.and indeed by taking it have shown that they should be disbanded ASAP since they are clearly an activist bench.

        I heard someone reading out: “Bill of Rights Clause 9: “Proceedings in parliament shall not be impeached or otherwise questioned in any other Court or place.”

        That is a correct law, a proper law.
        The law the SC gave – inventing a brand new criterion for prorogation that never existed before – is an improper law, an unlawful law.
        A very damaging law which has greatly harmed the ongoing situation and almost certainly precipitated some very dangerous times for the UK since all pretense of mutual goodwill on the various sides of this has been abandoned. This is Lawfare writ large. Remainers may well win this way, but the country will lose greatly.

        Both the Benn Act and the SC Judgment have revealed to millions just how far away the UK is from being a well run representatively governed society. The Remain side may win all this and manage to derail Brexit, but the harvest that you will reap from all this Parliamentary and Supreme Court chicanery will damage the country for decades. Indeed, once enough people see that the system is able to circumvent their vote, I suspect there will be violent riots up and down the country such as haven’t been seen in over a century, and once Boris has been replaced – perhaps in next two to three days by more ridiculous parliamentary chicanery, Remainers won’t be able to blame him any more and will have to confront the populace who they have betrayed and, yes, harmed.

        Anyway, you have a good blog and make your points clearly, for which I thank you, even though (obviously) disagreeing.

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  6. Alex Green Avatar
    Alex Green

    Thanks to everyone who posted their comments on this. This will be the last supplementary post I leave, however the objections raised were very helpful in clarifying the argument. By way of signing off then, three final points for Roger.

    First, the preponderance of evidence suggested that whilst prorogation is usually constitutionally uncontroversial, in this case the situation was different. Parliament has not been prorogued for more than three weeks since 1979, and the finding of fact by the court, which took into account all the available information (including such witness statements as there were), was that there was no apparent reason for a five week break. You seem to disagree with that, although I do not think that this is the forum for a detailed argument on those facts.

    Second, whilst the Prime Minister was indeed elected to his constituency in Parliament, no Prime Minister is elected to government. They are all appointed on the basis that they represent the majority of the commons. It should be kept in mind that our current PM did not run for a general election as a leadership candidate but was elected to the headship of his party by a mere 92,153 votes. That is a minuscule fraction of the population, such that his representative credentials as leader of the executive are quite thin. (By way of a side point, given this set of facts, I struggle to see how the current government is any less part of the ‘establishment’, whatever that should be taken to mean. The Prime Minister is, demographically speaking, just about as establishment as it is possible to get.)

    Now, whilst it is true that the judiciary are not elected at all, representation is not their constitutional role. Instead, they are there to uphold the rule of law, which brings me to my final point.

    Third, had the Supreme Court ruled the other way, particularly on the basis that this ‘political’ matter (as you put it) was non-justiciable, it would have set an extremely dangerous precedent. In effect, the courts would have been removing all legal accountability from the executive power to prorogue Parliament. Given that Parliament can hold no one to account whilst prorogued, this would have created a lacuna, resulting the potential for a total loss of executive accountability whenever that power was inappropriately used. This would be catastrophic for the rule of law (and democracy) in the UK. This concern was the principle motivation for my post.

  7. […] of our Brexit crisis without a vote. At the end of the vision of enhanced executive power, the Supreme Court warned, stood the threat of […]

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