Brian Christopher Jones: Nigel Farage and the UK Constitution

The upheaval of the UK constitution from 2016 onwards has been associated with a host of individuals, from David Cameron to Boris Johnson to Dominic Cummings, who have received the significant bulk of academic attention in recent years. And yet, another individual has had a substantial impact upon the UK constitution during this time: Nigel Farage. But his impact has not been as direct as other constitutional actors, and has often been scorned, sidelined, or generally undocumented. I can find only passing mentions of Farage on this blog, in addition to other major blogs on the UK constitution. Most of the articles mentioning him do so fleetingly, casting him in a negative light in relation to populism and his influence on Brexit (although some take a slightly more nuanced look). And yet, controversial though he is, Mr Farage deserves more attention. Although it may be easy to discount Farage as a fringe politician that has never held domestic political office, some of the issues and challenges his involvement in politics has brought forward go to the heart of the UK’s constitutional system.

Writing about Nigel Farage is a challenging prospect. He’s considered one of the most disliked politicians in contemporary Britain. I write this piece not to praise or celebrate Mr Farage or his impact on the constitution, but to directly confront the challenges and explore the lessons that Mr Farage’s political activity has occasioned throughout the years. This short piece explores the ways Farage has impacted the UK constitution, focusing on two themes in particular: the impact and relevance of Farage’s political parties and his influence as a non-Westminster, non-government politician.

Demonstrating 3rd party relevance

One of the biggest complaints about the current political system is the lack of real alternative options beyond the two major parties. A large number of people believe that the two major parties are the same or similar (see p 29), and that there’s no good alternative option. This is a view that has held for several elections, and is currently being asserted in the context of the upcoming election. Votes for third parties that get only marginal or very little representation in Westminster have been called ‘wasted’ by some campaign groups, and reformers also consider that any votes for parties outside of the party in government are ‘ignored’, and the corresponding voters ‘voiceless’. Additionally, some believe that a large number of votes are tactical and therefore do not represent the voter’s original preference. Complaints about the status quo often go beyond the supposedly ‘broken’ electoral system, and become part of a wider argument about a ‘broken politics’. But Farage has challenged many of these views, as his political parties have made serious gains and influenced the direction of travel on major constitutional issues without securing significant numbers of MPs in Parliament. Indeed, this has been reinforced at multiple levels and in multiple elections.

The UK Independence Party (UKIP) was founded in 1993 with the aim of taking the UK out of the European Union, but the party only became a political force after two decades of existence. In the 2013 local elections UKIP garnered 22% of the popular vote and gained 139 more councillors than it had before. After securing notable results in previous European Parliament elections, the 2014 European elections produced the Party’s landmark victory, as it tallied more votes and seats than any other UK political party. These results did not go unnoticed, especially by the Conservative Party, which campaigned on a manifesto commitment to hold a referendum on membership of the European Union in the 2015 general election.

In the 2015 general election UKIP garnered 3.8 million votes, amounting to 12.6% of all votes cast. And yet, this vote total only secured one MP at Westminster. These voters chose UKIP despite knowing that the party would be unlikely to gain a significant number of seats or serve in government. And even if some of the votes for UKIP were tactical votes against the Conservatives, this still demonstrates that an attractive 3rd party can produce political tremors with major constitutional consequences. If UKIP only received an insignificant number of votes in that election, the mandate for David Cameron to hold an EU referendum would not have been as strong (although it is acknowledged the manifesto commitment would have remained).

Mr Farage’s Brexit Party produced even better results in the 2019 European elections than UKIP did in the 2014 election. It won the most seats and the most votes, beating out the second place Liberal Democrats by close to 2 million votes. These results indirectly factored into the strategic direction of the Conservative Party (e.g., the ousting of Theresa May as PM, the choice of Boris Johnson as leader, and the primary focus on Brexit during the election campaign). Only through the success of this new strategic direction did the Brexit Party agree to stand down their candidates in the 2019 general election, again demonstrating the power that an influential 3rd party can have within the electoral system.

The impact of UKIP and the Brexit Party on the UK’s exit from the European Union is most significant because leading figures in both the major parties didn’t have an appetite to leave the EU (just as the majority of MPs in Parliament didn’t either). And yet Farage’s parties led the conversation and ultimately pushed many people—especially a good deal of those within the Conservative Party—to reconsider their positions. This is far from the direct effects seen through proportional representation, but it demonstrates that 3rd parties in the UK system can produce significant results, influencing the direction of travel on major constitutional issues without even being in government. Mr Farage’s parties have demonstrated this time and again.

A new, and different, challenge to the UK constitution

The UK constitution conjures up images of Parliament, MPs, and Government ministers, especially the Prime Minister and other Great Offices of State. Some would also point to the Crown, the judiciary, the civil service, and perhaps devolved governments. Occasionally, people may think of backbench or opposition MPs, who are at times able to drive the agenda or conversation regarding important issues. Rarely would anybody identify as constitutionally important someone who has never served in government, never been an MP, has failed to become an MP seven times, and has spent most of their electoral career not in London, but in Brussels, for a fringe third party. But Farage has demonstrated that Westminster outsiders can impact the UK constitution. And for a constitution that many describe as executive dominated (p 95), elitist, and out of touch with ordinary voters, Nigel Farage’s rise demonstrates those views of the constitution may be inaccurate or need significant revision. Although he’s never served in government or even been an MP at Westminster, Farage has been instrumental in setting the domestic agenda (p 412) in recent years.

He also may be more of a threat to the constitutional status quo than any other current politician. Farage possesses less reverence for the more traditional or established elements of the UK constitution, including long standing constitutional principles such as parliamentary sovereignty. In a 2014 speech at the Institute for Government he advocated the use of direct democracy, saying that it should be used when ‘the political class have got too far out of touch with public opinion’. In that same speech he also expressed the need for a written UK constitution, and he’s long advocated for a change to proportional representation, all of which may impact the operation and functionality of the constitution. Speaking to the BBC in 2014 about devolution he said the UK needs to hold a constitutional convention and that ‘everything must be on the table’. These ideas certainly go well beyond anything being advocated by the two major parties.

But Farage’s radicalism has also gone beyond conventional notions of constitutional reform. His most recent political parties have been organised differently than traditional political parties. In 2019 he registered the Brexit Party as a limited company, and has done the same for Reform UK. He may have gotten this idea after undertaking a close look at the 5-Star Movement in Italy. This structure allows him more control over party operation and less bureaucracy when making decisions, as he’s the majority shareholder. Although political parties in the association model are also subject to significant influence by strong leaders, their control is less overt than in the company model, as it’s based on influence rather than the proportion of shares held.

Farage’s recent appearance as a contestant on ITV’s I’m a Celebrity…Get Me Out of Here! also demonstrates the political clout that he carries, even without ever being an MP nor having served in government. In addition to fuelling his celebrity status, the show allowed him opportunities to discuss constitutional reform. He pontificated on the House of Lords, which he called a ‘complete anachronism’, and said that its operation amounts to ‘pretty corrupt stuff’ (he said similar things about the EU parliament). These views reached a wide audience and chime with those who advocate Lords reform, even if the Lords remains one element of the UK constitution that actually works quite well.

Similar to demonstrating the relevance of third parties, Farage has also shown that non-Government, non-Ministerial, and essentially non-Westminster politicians can impact the direction of travel of the UK constitution.

More to come?

Nigel Farage may not be finished with politics. Reform UK is polling over 10%, and could take a similar stake of voters as UKIP in 2015. Outside this, Farage and others have speculated that once the Tories lose the 2024 election, he may be in line to become leader or could potentially rejoin the party as an MP. A Farage-led or highly influenced Tory party could be much more amenable to changes in the UK’s election structure, the composition of Parliament, and even allegiance to major constitutional principles. 

Whilst Farage has promoted causes sympathetic to the political right, the success of his third parties and his outsider (i.e. non-Westminster, non-government) influence on the political system is something that all constitutional watchers should take note of. There’s no reason that similar forms of influence could not come from the political left or from the political centre.

What seems clear is that Nigel Farage has provoked some interesting and potentially uncomfortable insights regarding the operation of the UK’s constitution. And if he gets back into politics or ends up further aligning himself with the Tories, more challenges may arise.  

Special thanks to Richard Craven, Robert Craig, Mike Gordon and Se-shauna Wheatle for comments on a previous version of this post.

Brian Christopher Jones is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Liverpool School of Law and Social Justice.

(Suggested citation: B. C. Jones, ‘Nigel Farage and the UK Constitution’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (5th February 2024) (available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/))