Human rights in the UK are routinely reviewed by various UN bodies – treaty bodies, special procedures, and the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). The influence of these activities in the UK has been the subject of some inquiry in the past (see, notably, Brice Dickson’s recent book on the subject). But what has remained elusive is whether the work of these bodies has any salience to the UK Government. As the prime initiator of policy and legislation, the executive holds significant power to implement the recommendations of UN bodies that it supports. Hence, we must understand the extent to which policymakers engage with the findings and recommendations of human rights mechanisms to fully appreciate their impact (or lack thereof). Do they have any bearing at all on decision-making, or simply pass under the radar? Is engagement with the UN mechanisms a mere ritual, or a means of securing greater respect for rights in the UK?  

Unsurprisingly, these questions have been largely neglected. As Professor Aileen Kavanagh has recently remarked, the executive is seen as ‘the constitutional villain’. Public law scholars, therefore, have sometimes overlooked the part that the Government plays and could play in protecting rights. The same can be said for engagement with the UN bodies, and the internal arrangements in Government for UN reporting and implementation.

Nevertheless, on 24^th April, we gleaned some insights on these questions from an evidence session held by Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights on ‘Government’s compliance with its international human rights obligations’. In attendance were Lord Bellamy KC, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (with responsibility for human rights), and Rob Linham OBE, Deputy Director for Rights Policy, both from the Ministry of Justice.

A focus of the Committee in this session was scrutiny of the Government’s formal processes for navigating and coordinating human rights across departments. Notably, it was queried whether there were plans for the Government to adopt a ‘National Mechanism for Implementation, Reporting and Follow-up’ (NMIRF). As defined by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), this is:

a national public mechanism or structure that is mandated to coordinate and prepare reports to and engage with international and regional human rights mechanisms […] to coordinate and track national follow-up and implementation of the treaty obligations and the recommendations emanating from these mechanisms.

This line of questioning appeared in part prompted by evidence provided to the Committee in May 2023 (including that which I provided along with colleagues from Birmingham City University). Recent calls from the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), non-governmental organisations, and the United Nations High Commissioner are also likely to have contributed. NMIRFs, Human Rights Council Resolution 51/33 suggests, can benefit the implementation of human rights commitments, and “facilitate the mainstreaming of human rights”.

Lord Bellamy confirmed in the session the existing arrangements in government whereby the Ministry of Justice plays a light touch role, providing legal and policy support to departments when human rights issues arise, but that there is no formal coordination or encouragement (or otherwise) in relation to implementation specifically. Instead, individual departments are responsible for actioning recommendations that fall within their respective policy areas.

Upon being asked by Jill Mortimer MP whether these arrangements need to be improved, Lord Bellamy claimed these worked “well”, are “pragmatic”, and “awareness of human rights obligations across government and across departments is pretty high”. Unsurprisingly, then, Lord Bellamy was clear that the Government were “not in favour of further formal mechanisms” which would be “administrative clutter”.

Justifying this, Lord Bellamy further explained that such mechanisms may be more desirable in other states where ministries have “a great deal more operational independence”. In the UK, however, Lord Bellamy suggests we are “fortunate” that the operation of the convention of collective responsibility enables us to “coordinate and cooperate very effectively across departments”. Mr Linham expressed this as a “mainstreamed manner” where each department is asked to “bear human rights in mind”. Nevertheless, the work of the Ministry of Justice, Mr Linham explained, enables the government to “coordinate on questions that are cross-cutting”.

These views are perhaps expected since previous administrations have generally been sceptical of such changes, foremost because they view the status quo as effective. An NMIRF is simply not perceived as necessary.

On one hand, it is easy to dismiss the Government’s position in the face of the aforementioned calls from civil society, the United Nations, and the assertions made in Human Rights Council Resolution 51/33. We also know from research into policymaking in Whitehall that departments are ‘famously siloed, reinforced by budget allocation and accountability mechanisms’. Claims of human rights collaboration or cooperation across government appear, at first glance, challenging to defend.

Nevertheless, the observations of Lord Bellamy and Mr Linham on the efficacy of the current ‘mainstreaming’ approach are pertinent. Whether institutions, executives or otherwise, should centralise human rights protection or not is far from clear. The literature on parliamentary human rights committees for instance reveals a mixed picture: there are advantages and disadvantages whether a parliament operates a single human rights committee (centralising) or expects all committees to engage with human rights (mainstreaming). In relation to National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs), there has been a global move toward single bodies responsible for promoting and protecting human rights generally. But in the UK, this move was not necessarily welcomed when the EHRC was introduced. Some considered that the rights-specific organisations that came before (for instance, the Commission for Racial Equality) were better suited to address the discrete issues affecting marginalised groups. In short, centralising the promotion and protection of human rights, in government or otherwise, is not inherently desirable.

Indeed, research on human rights in government does suggest there already is a ‘human rights consciousness’ in the UK civil service, and a culture of respect for rights does exist (even if this is not always apparent from the decisions taken by ministers). And some cross-departmental human rights collaboration does already happen through specific streams, including the Action Group on children’s rights, co-chaired by the Department for Education and Children’s Rights Alliance for England, and the EHRC’s Treaty Monitoring Working Group.

Furthermore, the timeliness and consistency of the UK’s reporting to UN bodies is sound. According to the UN Treaty Body database, at the time of writing the average number of overdue reports that states owe to the UN treaty bodies is three, whereas the UK is one of 52 states that has no overdue reports. With respect to the UPR, the UK has always submitted voluntary mid-term reports, something that only 47 states in the last third cycle achieved.

This is not to say that the UK’s approach is perfect. The EHRC’s ‘Human Rights Tracker’ reveals regression or no progress from the UK Government in 16 of its 36 human rights ‘topics’, each of which is aligned with UN recommendations. This suggests (albeit does not prove) that the implementation of these recommendations may be inadequate.

Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that government structures are wholly or even partly to blame, nor that an NMIRF would be the solution. In fact, the claim in Human Rights Council Resolution 51/33 that NMIRFs improve implementation is debatable. Two significant studies on NMIRFs by the OHCHR, in 2016 and 2022, shed light on the value of these mechanisms. The main benefit of NMIRFs, these studies found, was improving reporting efficiency to UN bodies and reducing reporting backlog. However, whether and to what extent these mechanisms affect implementation is not evident. If the primary benefit of an NMIRF is foremost improved reporting, then the case for change in the UK is not immediately clear.

In sum, the evidence given by Lord Bellamy and Mr Linham provides a timely opportunity to interrogate the Government’s current approach to engagement with the UN human rights mechanisms. Despite growing pressure for change, it is doubtful whether moving to a more centralised approach – if by NMIRF or otherwise – is necessary. Whilst it is perhaps wrong to simply dismiss these mechanisms as “administrative clutter”, the UK (and indeed, other states) should reflect carefully on their probable value and the likely improvement upon existing arrangements. If we’re to say that implementation is the prime area of concern, then we may need to look beyond government structures, and instead at perceptions of rights among the political elite. It also remains pertinent to look beyond government and to examine how other actors in the domestic sphere – Parliament, NHRIs, and the judiciary – can better contribute to the fulfilment of the UK’s international obligations.

I am grateful to my colleagues at the University of Worcester, Dr Josie Welsh and Dr Chris Monaghan, for their comments on earlier drafts of this piece. I would also like to thank the editors for their valuable feedback. Any errors remain my own.

Dr Michael Lane, Lecturer in Law, University of Worcester

Twitter/X: @Dr_Michael_Lane

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/dr-michael-lane/

(Suggested citation: M. Lane, ‘“Administrative Clutter” or a Case for Centralising Human Rights? UN Human Rights Mechanisms and the UK Government’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (7th May 2024) (available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/)