Joanna Bell & Hayley J Hooper: Not in my (Constitutional) Backyard: How Not to Speed Up Planning Challenges

Important issues of UK constitutional law can arise in the most unusual of places. Some of the most important cases on undergraduate reading lists, for example, concerned disputes about fishing licences and whether goods could be measured in imperial, rather than metric, units. In this blog we draw attention to a proposal which, if enacted, would be of enormous constitutional significance. Yet it is located in a place many public lawyers would not think to look. 

In May 2026 the Treasury published a policy paper entitled Getting Britain Building Again. The subtitle of the paper is ‘Reforming Judicial Review for Infrastructure’. It proposes the creation of a constitutionally novel ‘parliamentary authorisation mechanism’ which would confer on development consent orders (‘DCOs’) a legal status ‘akin to an Act of Parliament.’ Here, we introduce the proposal and its background. We then go on to explain why, if enacted, it would give rise to important and contentious issues of constitutional law. 

Getting Britain Building Again: Background

The background to the Getting Britain Building Again is deep and widespread frustration with the time taken for proposed infrastructure, and especially energy, projects to be built. Much of the blame has fallen at the feet of law and legal process. Pre-decision legal processes, such as environmental impact and habitats assessments, it is said, place far too many time-consuming and disproportionately expensive demands on developers. Meanwhile post-decision legal challenges, while often unsuccessful, create lengthy delays and increase the financial risks associated with promoting major infrastructure. 

Calls for the need to cut back ‘red tape’ in the planning context are, of course, nothing new. What is striking about the current climate, however, is how reform is being urged from across the political spectrum. Deregulation has typically been an agenda associated with the political right. Recently, however, self-proclaimed liberals and progressives have begun to clamour for change, characterising the legal process as inhibiting growth and development. The ability to build, and build quickly, the thinking goes, is essential to tackling issues those on the political left should care about, including decarbonising the economy and addressing the country’s affordable housing crisis. Energy autonomy was also highlighted by the Labour Government in 2025 as an aspect of national security.

Reforming Judicial Review of Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects

The UK Government has already taken concrete steps to speed up legal challenges. Last year, the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 introduced important changes to judicial review challenges to ‘nationally significant infrastructure projects’ (or NSIPs). The effect of the reforms is that applicants now have at most two opportunities to obtain leave for judicial review from the courts, as opposed to the usual three. This is reduced to a single opportunity if their claim is deemed ‘totally without merit’.

These reforms originated in the influential Banner review. They are significant and their effects are already being felt. Banner’s proposals were, however, wholly orthodox in the sense that they explicitly sought to adjust judicial review practice in a manner consistent with established legal principle. The modesty of Banner’s reforms has led some critics to argue that they do not go nearly far enough. A recent Policy Exchange paper, for instance, evocatively describes them as ‘reminiscent of the sound of a string quartet as an iceberg looms menacingly into view’. 

The Proposal: The Parliamentary Authorisation Mechanism

Modesty, however, is not a word which could be used to describe the Getting Britain Building Again paper. The paper promises further action in pursuit of the Government’s ‘defining mission’ of delivering infrastructure. It briefly sets out two further reform proposals. The second – the introduction of a ‘challenge window’ – has been subjected to insightful evaluation elsewhere. Our focus here is on the first proposal: the introduction of a ‘parliamentary authorisation mechanism.’ It is worth quoting from the paper at length (our emphasis):

‘Where Parliament deems a project of sufficient national importance, this mechanism would be designed to give the eventual consent effectively the same protections as afforded by primary legislation. Under this model, the Energy Secretary would determine that a project should be designated as of Critical National Importance, and the House of Commons would then vote to confirm that designation.

The normal process for submission and examination of the development consent order would then continue – but with the final decision put before the House of Commons again at the end of the process, and a further vote held. If approved, the DCO would be afforded a distinct statutory status specified in the underpinning legislation, akin to an Act of Parliament. As a result, the DCO would be protected from judicial review on issues other than human rights grounds.’ (paragraphs 7-8).

From a constitutional point of view, many things are striking about the above paragraphs, and this post does not claim to be exhaustive. However, taken at face value, the proposal engages in a novel constitutional exercise. It proposes, by way of primary legislation, to imbue a decision that is the output of a process that is demonstrably not legislative with the same status as an Act of Parliament. 

It is important to be clear that the proposal is not to authorise infrastructure projects by enacting primary legislation. This has been done in the past, including for HS2 and Crossrail. What is being proposed is something fundamentally different. The idea is to essentially tack on to the end of the existing planning process a final stage in which the Commons is invited to vote on the Secretary of State’s proposal to authorise development. If this stage were passed, what would be produced would not be an Act of Parliament and crucially would not have undergone anything in the way of meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. The intended effect, however, is that it would be treated as if it was. 

Constitutional Complexity: The Inevitability of Litigation

Getting Britain Building Again makes clear that the object of the parliamentary – or, to be more precise, Commons – approval mechanism would be to give developers a ‘high degree of certainty against delay’ (paragraph 9) by ‘protecting’ a favourable decision from judicial review. It is no small irony that, in seeking to provide developers with enhanced legal certainty, the Treasury has put forward a proposal which would almost certainly lead to developers being embroiled in litigation about deeply contentious issues of constitutional law. Indeed, it is hard to think of a proposal more likely to result in litigation of such significance it would inevitably reach the UK Supreme Court. 

To explain why, let us imagine that the Treasury’s proposal has reached the statute books. The Getting Britain Building Again paper is very light on detail, and much would depend on legislative drafting. Let us assume for argument, however, that the relevant statutory provision (which we will call ‘imaginary clause 1’) says something like:

‘Development consent orders approved by the House of Commons have a legal status equivalent to an Act of Parliament.’ 

Now imagine that the House of Commons has approved a development consent order and an applicant has sought leave from the High Court for judicial review to challenge it. The question would arise: has imaginary clause 1, by equating the Commons approved development consent order with an Act of Parliament, effectively excluded the possibility of judicial review? 

The assumption underpinning the Getting Britain Building Again paper is clearly that judicial review would not be available (other, presumably, than on human rights grounds which are rarely argued in the infrastructure context). The legal picture, however, is vastly more complex. The issue would engage at least two, related but distinct, lines of precedent. The first concerns ouster clauses; the second engages broader and deeper questions about what justifies the insulation of certain forms of legislation from judicial review. 

Beginning, first, with ouster clauses, the case law is both complex and evolving. What is well settled, however, is that courts are required to interpret legislative provisions purporting to immunise decisions by administrative bodies from legal challenge restrictively. Judicial review of administrative decision-making can, in other words, be curtailed only by the clearest possible legislative language. The leading case remains the UK Supreme Court ruling in R. (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal. 

Imaginary clause 1 may engender debate about whether its content qualifies it as an ouster. The provision above, after all, does not have the form of a traditional ouster clause, which usually speak explicitly to the (in)ability of courts to entertain legal challenges, such as by providing that a determination (etc) cannot be ‘called into question.’ Ouster clauses containing language to this effect might be called explicit ousters. 

While imaginary clause 1 is not an explicit ouster, it would very clearly be an attempt to achieve the same effects in substance. In this regard, it is worth highlighting that the administrative process which precedes the Secretary of State’s decision to make a development consent order is highly legally structured. There are, in other words, a great many legal requirements – primarily derived from planning, environmental, and general administrative law – with which the Secretary of State and her advising planning inspectors are required to comply. If imaginary clause 1 prevented judicial review it would, in effect, render these legal requirements wholly unenforceable. Ousting judicial oversight of legal error is, in other words, at the very heart of this proposal. 

Creating a clause intended as an implicit ouster may seem like lateral move designed to avoid previous judicial authority. Clauses argued to implicitly oust judicial review, however, still attract the legal principle requiring the courts to assume that Parliament intends to preserve judicial review in the absence of the clearest possible language. Cart v Upper Tribunal makes this clear. In Cart government counsel unsuccessfully argued that Parliament’s statutory conferral of the status of ‘superior court of record’ upon the Upper Tribunal by way of section 3 of the Tribunals, Courts, and Enforcement Act 2007, was sufficient to preclude judicial review. The High Court (subsequently endorsed by the Supreme Court) was wholly unpersuaded. Laws LJ dismissed the claim that a ‘deeming provision’ designating the nature of an institution as equivalent to the High Court could exclude judicial review. In fact, he went as far as to describe this as a ‘constitutional solecism’. As a matter of law, any restriction on judicial review could only be achieved using ‘the most clear and explicit words’. 

If the foregoing observations are right, imaginary clause 1 would engage the legal principle requiring restrictive interpretation of clauses aimed at excluding exclude judicial review. It is neither necessary nor helpful to speculate here on what a restrictive interpretation of the clause might look like. The crucial point is that the assumption underpinning the Getting Britain Building Again paper, that the proposed authorisation mechanism would straightforwardly result in the exclusion of judicial review, is fundamentally misconceived. 

Within the second relevant line of case law, one of the most important cases is Jackson v HM Attorney General. In this case, a nine-bench House of Lords unanimously rejected the claim that legislation made using the procedure in Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949 lacked  the same status as an Act of Parliament. The Parliament Acts allow for primary legislation, other than a money Bill or a Bill extending the life of Parliament beyond five years, to be made without the consent of the House of Lords. Lord Bingham, in the lead opinion, explained that the text of section 2(1) of the Parliament Act 1911 was clearly intended to confer the status of Act of Parliament on Bills enacted through this procedure.

Jackson, then, shows that Parliament can alter the process through which Acts of Parliament are created. This was regarded as a necessary corollary of parliamentary sovereignty. However, it does not (and should not) follow from Jackson that the courts would treat imaginary clause 1 as having the effect envisaged by the Getting Britain Build Again paper. The main reason for this conclusion is that the House of Lords’ willingness to treat the Parliament Acts as having the effect they claimed to have was intimately bound up with the historical context in which they were created, and their amplification of democracy in the legislative process.

As Baroness Hale noted in Jackson, the Parliament Acts sought to cure a persistent constitutional imbalance, namely, that the unelected upper house was able to frustrate the will of the electorate. The Parliament Act of 1911 came to pass in unique historical circumstances. The House of Lords had vetoed Lloyd George’s ‘people’s budget’, which included taxation and welfare reforms. This had occurred despite the budget’s overwhelming popular support. Without the Parliament Acts ‘[t]he party with the permanent majority in the unelected House of Lords could forever thwart the will of the elected House of Commons no matter how clearly that will had been endorsed by the electorate.’ (Baroness Hale, Jackson) 

The Parliament Acts procedure can create Acts of Parliament, as opposed to a lesser form of legislation, due to a combination of Parliament’s sovereignty and an intensification of democratic legitimacy in the legislative process. Notwithstanding the pro-democracy rebalancing which the process achieves, Lord Bingham suggested in Jackson that it should nevertheless be used sparingly. He expressed a concern that recourse by various governments to the Parliament Acts procedure which were not for ‘the major constitutional purposes for which the 1911 Act was invoked… but to achieve objects of more minor or no constitutional import’ merited ‘serious and objective thought and study’. After all, the Jackson case was about fox hunting.

If recourse to the Parliament Acts should be met with hesitation, imaginary clause 1 should engender outright trepidation. While legislation produced through the Parliament Acts ultimately bypasses the House of Lords it is, in the course of its passage, subject to scrutiny and debate in both chambers and, depending on its content, across a range of select committees. Commons-approved development consent orders would be subjected to nothing of this kind. Decision-making would occur entirely outside of Parliament. The role of the (usually executive-dominated) Commons would, then, be limited simply to giving (or withholding) its seal of approval of what the Secretary of State had decided. The proposal is, in other words, to aggrandise an executive decision by cloaking it with only the thinnest veil of democratic legitimacy in the form of a Commons vote.

Other cases support this analysis. There is Supreme Court authority that makes clear that the mere fact legislation is ‘delegated’ or ‘secondary’ (in the technical sense of deriving from a parent Act) is not conclusive of its relationship with the supervisory jurisdiction. AXA concerned the status of legislation from the devolved parliaments. The UK Supreme Court concluded that Acts of the Scottish Parliament (ASPs) are not amenable to the ‘ordinary’ grounds of judicial review, e.g. illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety (GCHQ). The reason for this is that ASPs possess democratic credentials sufficient to distinguish them from them from executive-made legislation, i.e. secondary legislation or Prerogative Orders in Council (primary legislation made entirely by the executive). This compelled the conclusion that ASPs must have a different relationship with the supervisory jurisdiction. Importantly, Lord Reed also reasoned that ‘classification of legislation as primary or secondary is not determinative of its susceptibility to judicial review’. This strongly suggests that designation of the status ‘akin’ or ‘equivalent’ to an Act of Parliament alone, even if done by Act of Parliament, would not be sufficient to immunise a decision from judicial review. 

To put all of this another way, legislative supremacy is accorded to Acts of Parliament because its legislative procedures contain internal checks and balances. Measures which do not go through these checks – such as secondary legislation  and executive legislation – are, rightly, not afforded the same status. To attempt to disturb this position would not only be profoundly constitutionally unwise, but it would also take parties involved in infrastructure challenges into deep and unchartered constitutional waters.

Conclusion: How Not to Speed Up Planning Challenges

If the proposal to create a Parliamentary (or, more accurately, Commons) approval process for designated infrastructure projects were enacted, it would give rise to a great many things: important questions of constitutional law, complex litigation which would take many months if not years to resolve, and interesting case law for scholars and students to reflect on for many years to come. One thing it would not result in would be increased legal certainty for developers. The effect, in all likelihood, would be to increase, not to initially reduce, the complexity and length of the legal proceedings which arise in relation to infrastructure projects. 

There are also broader reasons to be concerned. If a measure like the ‘parliamentary authorisation mechanism’ were enacted, it would pose a serious and significant risk to UK constitutional culture. At base, any attempt to elevate an executive-driven measure to parity of status with Acts of Parliament fundamentally misunderstands the basis for affording such Acts legislative supremacy in the British constitution. 

Joanna Bell & Hayley J Hooper, University of Oxford

(Suggested citation: J. Bell and H.J. Hooper, ‘Not in my (Constitutional) Backyard: How Not to Speed Up Planning Challenges’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (8th October 2026) (available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/))

Comments

One response to “Joanna Bell & Hayley J Hooper: Not in my (Constitutional) Backyard: How Not to Speed Up Planning Challenges”

  1. Liam Laurence Smyth Avatar
    Liam Laurence Smyth

    I’m not sure you’re right to suggest that “legislative supremacy is accorded to Acts of Parliament *because* its legislative procedures contain internal checks and balances”. If that were the case, judicial restraint might be sorely tried by the current use of programming in the Commons. The European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020, for example, whistled through all its stages in both Houses within a few hours on 30 December 2020. How legislative procedures are used in making Acts of Parliament is up to Parliament itself.

Leave a Reply