University of Bristol Centre for European and Public Law

18:00-19:30 July 3^rd 2025

2.13 Wills Memorial Building, University of Bristol and Online at https://bristol-ac-uk.zoom.us/j/97632863445

The Centre for European and Public Law invites you to join us for the launch of Dr Robert Craig’s new book: Royal Law: Prerogative Foundations. The event will include a brief introduction to and a discussion on the key themes of the book, followed by time for questions from the audience. A small drinks reception will be held for in-person attendees after the event. In-person attendance is on a strictly first-come, first-served basis.

Speakers Include:

• Robert Craig (University of Bristol and author of Royal Law)

• Hayley Hooper (University of Oxford)
• Gavin Philipson (University of Bristol)
• Julian Rivers (University of Bristol)
• Leah Trueblood (University of Oxford)

About Royal Law: Prerogative Foundations:

Royal Law argues that prerogative powers encompass all the non-statutory powers of the Crown. Hence, the Crown has no ‘third source’ powers, common law powers or ‘Ram doctrine’ style freedoms. Royal Law builds on Dicey’s definition of the prerogative, arguing that it comprises all residual non-statutory rights, powers, duties, and immunities historically ascribed to the Crown. However, it contends that Blackstone’s alternative definition, that prerogative powers are only those powers exclusive to the Crown, is also correct. The book explains how Dicey and Blackstone can be reconciled. The prerogative of justice is suggested as the original source of legal authority and legitimacy of common law judicial decisions. Common law is, or was, royal law. Defined as a putative non-statutory, non-prerogative third source of judicial legitimacy, authority or jurisdiction, ‘common law’ does not exist. There are only two ultimate sources of jurisdictional authority: statute and prerogative. The book further argues that Wade was mistaken to contend that the Crown has ‘common law powers’. It also has no ‘third source freedoms’, as suggested by Harris, or in the ‘Ram Doctrine’. The book, therefore, reframes the relevant case law as examples of judicial regulation of prerogative powers, crucially including the largely forgotten prerogative power to administer the realm. Hence, the book concludes that legal powers such as a minister’s power to enter into contracts or make ex gratia payments of public money are directly or indirectly grounded in prerogative power.

Any questions about the event should be directed to Robert.Greally@bristol.ac.uk or Emily.Hancox@Bristol.ac.uk