Leonid Sirota: Tortoise Media: Another Step towards the Political Constitution’s Demise?

At the outset of their judgment for the Supreme Court in R (Miller) v Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41, [2020] AC 373 (a.k.a. Miller No. 2), Lady Hale and Lord Reed sought to reassure those who might be nervous about its implications: the case, they said, ‘arises in circumstances which have never arisen before and are unlikely ever to arise again. It is a “one off”’. But the law is not supposed to work like that; once given, the reasons for judgment become part of the mass of legal materials of which jurists must make sense, and on which advocates and judges will rely in future cases.

One difficult aspect of Miller No. 2 of which commentators, the present author included, have sought to make sense is its relationship with the political constitution. While some accepted the Supreme Court’s position that the judgment gave effect to truly legal principles, others argued that it enforced political norms or constitutional conventions. I was, and remain, in the latter camp, arguing that the Supreme Court’s judgment ‘can be used by future litigants to demand and by courts to grant judicial enforcement of conventions’. (At 136) 

How? Simply by framing the heretofore conventional rule as a legal limit on the scope the royal prerogative whose exercise the convention governs. That, I argued, is what the Supreme Court did in Miller No. 2, treating the political practice of short prorogations as a convention and transmuting it into a legal limit on the prerogative power to prorogue Parliament. Although some have suggested that the principle or convention the Supreme Court enforced was simply executive accountability writ large, this is far too broad and multifaceted a concept. As I explain in detail in the article linked to above, what the Supreme Court did was to draw on Sir John Major’s evidence to establish the precedents and normative considerations bearing on prorogations, and give the norm derived from this process the force of law.

I speculated that:

the most dramatic, yet also plausible, example of an application of the Miller No. 2 reasoning would be a declaration as to the rules governing the selection, and (in consequence, or even in the alternative) the identity, of a Prime Minister following a contested transition of power, because the relevant conventions … limit Her Majesty’s prerogative power of appointing the Prime Minister. (At 137-38)

Fordham J’s recent judgment in R (Tortoise Media) v Conservative Party [2023] EWHC 3088 (Admin) provides support for this guess. Tortoise Media is concerned with the amenability to review of a governing political party’s choice of leader — which, due to the operation of the conventions regulating government formation, is in effect the choice of a Prime Minister. One of the claimant’s arguments, as summarised by Fordham J, was that the leadership selection was akin to the advice to prorogue Parliament that was invalidated in Miller No. 2 ‘because the party is deciding the content of the reviewable and justiciable advice to the Sovereign’.

Now, I think that it is a mistake to speak of a leadership selection, or indeed of anything else that precedes the appointment of a Prime Minister, as ‘advice to the Sovereign’, or at least as the same sort of advice that was at issue in Miller No. 2. The appointment of the Prime Minister is a reserve power, not exercised on advice, but instead directly governed by a rule — a constitutional convention. But the Cabinet Manual is ambivalent about this, and this is ultimately only a pedantic quibble. What I would like to focus on here is what Fordham J says about the argument. 

Fordham J is willing to assume ‘that Miller supports a scope for reviewability and justiciability in relation to advice to the Sovereign as to the appointment of a Prime Minister’. [46] This willingness might be in apparent contrast with the assumption of Lewis LJ in R (FDA) v Prime Minister [2021] EWHC 3279 (Admin) that ‘the appointment or dismissal of a minister, or the decision of the Prime Minister to retain a minister in office’ is non-justiciable because ‘[t]here are no judicial standards by which such purely political decisions can be judged’. [34] But there is no contradiction here: the King’s discretion in choosing a prime minister is circumscribed in ways a prime minister’s choice of minister is not, albeit that we would traditionally have understood it to be circumscribed by conventions and not legal rules or principles. More remarkable is the fact that Fordham J explicitly contemplates ‘an issue involving action beyond the scope and limit of the prerogative power, or even an illegality in the exercise of the prerogative power ’ [46; emphasis mine]—even though Miller No. 2 pointedly refrained from addressing the latter sort of argument. 

Fordham J outlines several scenarios where that might happen, some suggested by the parties and one of his own devising: perhaps the selection of a future Prime Minister has been ‘corrupted by the influence of a foreign state’ (or, I am tempted to add, Francis Urquart’s heirs and successors); perhaps the would-be premier is not a member of the House of Commons; perhaps he or she is incapacitated. Fordham J accepts the submission that ‘a candidate for judicial intervention would need to be an appointed person incapable of satisfying the constitutional rationale of commanding confidence and support in the House of Commons’. [46] Unlikely, one hopes, but possible in principle. 

I think that, at least until Miller No. 2, the view that, at least in some admittedly unlikely circumstances, the appointment of a Prime Minister would have been amenable to judicial review would have been a startling proposition. The constitutional orthodoxy, endorsed by the Supreme Court as recently as R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (a.k.a. Miller No. 1), was that the courts were strangers to conventions. They might take notice of these political rules, but not enforce them. But the device of transforming what Ivor Jennings, in his classic test for identifying conventions, described as the ‘reason for the rule’ which political actors in the relevant precedents followed and considered themselves bound by—or, in Fordham J’s words, ‘the constitutional rationale’ for it—into legal principles that limit the royal prerogative seems to have changed matters. If the approach suggested by Fordham J is followed, some of the key rules of the political constitution will have become legal rules.

Fordham J might demur. He endorses the ‘important caveat’ added by Kevin Brown, for the defendant, which is that, unlike in Miller No. 2, the appointment of a Prime Minister in breach of a convention could and presumably would trigger parliamentary accountability. As Fordham J sums it up, ‘[a]n inability to command that support [of the House of Commons] could therefore mean that a new mid-term Prime Minister does not in fact last long in office’. [47] Courts would not need to intervene, since the political process would sort things out. But there are two problems with this argument. 

First, it is contingent on political events: what if, in fact, the House of Commons doesn’t deny confidence to a Prime Minister who is, say, not one of its members? Why, indeed, should we assume that it would do so? If the party that has a majority in the House chose a non-member for its leader, why would that party’s parliamentary wing suddenly change their minds?

Perhaps, as this blog’s editors have suggested to me, this would still amount to a sufficient opportunity for political accountability. But this brings me to the second and related difficulty with the ‘caveat’ accepted by Fordham J. UK courts have tended to be unmoved by the prospects of political accountability when these were advanced as reasons to prevent them from enforcing legal accountability. Many of the critics of Miller No. 2 did in fact argue that there could have been political accountability there, and Parliament simply chose not to impose any. And even if the argument was not convincing in that case, surely there could have been political accountability in the circumstances of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Fire Brigades Union, [1995] 2 AC 513. As Lord Mustill pointed out, Parliament could have held the Home Secretary to account for his refusal to bring legislation into force—if it considered that this was problematic. Yet that possibility did not deter a majority of the House of Lords from holding that this potential for political accountability was not enough, and judicial intervention was warranted. So the ‘caveat’ is not, in my view, nearly as important as Fordham J thinks.

The hypothetical scenarios in which judicial review of the appointment of a Prime Minister could be sought are still, I hope, quite fanciful. But it now seems to be increasingly plausible, if not already conventional wisdom that, should the fanciful come to pass, it could in fact be judicially reviewable. After Miller No. 2 was decided, I suggested that it ‘call[ed] into question the continued vitality of a political constitution’, by making the conventions that were its beating heart subject to judicial enforcement. Tortoise Media takes another step towards a constitutional arrangement in which, as Antonin Scalia might have put it, the political constitution is dead, dead, dead.

I also suggested that, insofar as Miller No. 2 both was a product of and further contributed to the uncertainty of the rules of the United Kingdom’s ‘unwritten’ constitution, ‘writing down’ or, more accurately, codifying and entrenching this constitution would be a solution, though no doubt an imperfect one, to this problem. One objection to any such proposal is, of course, that it would undermine the political constitution, in particular by converting conventions into justiciable rules of law. But Fordham J’s judgment in Tortoise Media suggests that this has already happened. And if we are to have a legal and justiciable constitution in any case, working out its rules in advance, in a process of ‘reflection and choice’, in Hamilton’s words, seems far preferable to courts figuring them out on the fly in the midst of both legal and political controversy.

Leonid Sirota, Associate Professor in Law at the University of Reading

(Suggested citation: L. Sirota, ‘Tortoise Media: Another Step towards the Political Constitution’s Demise?’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (14th December 2023) (available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/))

Comments

2 responses to “Leonid Sirota: Tortoise Media: Another Step towards the Political Constitution’s Demise?”

  1. Victor Lilley Avatar
    Victor Lilley

    I don’t think that ‘Another Step towards the Political Constitution’s Demise’ is something to worry about, if the convention turns out to be unlawful. I say that as a victim of current positions of parliament that I think are unlawful and Unconstitutional.

    Take the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee PACAC representations on its web site:-

    https://committees.parliament.uk/work/7910/parliamentary-and-health-service-ombudsman-scrutiny-202223/

    ‘Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman Scrutiny 2022-23
    Inquiry

    The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (PACAC) is launching its annual scrutiny session into the work of the PHSO in the financial year 2022/23.

    According to the House of Commons Standing Order 146, PACAC’s role in relation to the PHSO is:

    to examine the reports of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration and the Health Service Commissioner for England, which are laid before this House, and matters in connection therewith

    PACAC therefore scrutinises the PHSO’s annual report and other reports that the Ombudsman chooses to lay before Parliament. Where these reports highlight failures in the quality and standards of Civil Service administration, PACAC may use them to hold the government to account.

    The Committee cannot review the PHSO’s adjudications on individual cases. This includes the PHSO’s decisions on whether or not to accept a case. As the office of the PHSO is independent, adjudications cannot be overruled by a government minister or any parliamentary committee.’

    See the last paragraph. For a start, the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 refers to ‘investigations’ not ‘adjudications’.

    Regarding not reviewing individual cases, I can see no legal basis for this and indeed the contrary.

    It is accepted that PHSO should deal with individual cases, in the first instance. However, if PHSO will not give a fair hearing, that task should fall to PACAC, as the part of Parliament tasked with holding the Executive to account via the PHSO.

    It can be seen from Della, Co-ordinator, of PHSO the Facts’s, diligent FOI’s requests, that the HOC has failed to disclose the minutes of the decision to change its policy, from considering individual cases, to not doing so. Subsequent PACAC minute decisions failed to give reasons. So it is inferred that the first decision changing the policy also failed to give reasons. This is an administrative decision so it is subject to Administrative Law/Natural Justice. So the decision is void. Hence the lawful current policy of PACAC is to CONSIDER individual decisions. So PACAC is currently operating unlawfully by disregarding its own current policy. Note the PACAC’s minutes are also contrary to Guide to Minute Taking, Cabinet Office, June 2001 which recommend, Discussion, Summing Up and Conclusion, which it is taken should contain adequate reasons for the decision. So The lawful current policy of PACAC is to CONSIDER individual decisions. So PACAC is currently operating unlawfully by disregarding its own current policy.

    There is nothing in the Parliamentary Rules; ‘The UK Parliament: Report of the Leader’s Group on Working Practices. Ch. 2, Holding the Executive to Account’ and ‘House of Commons Standing order 146’ that bans individual cases. Neither is there in the Human Rights Act 1998, Article 6; nor Magna Carta 1297 XXIX. So I find that PACAC is operatiing contrary to Natural Justice: Fettering discretion, and which is covering up the widespread serious injustice by the Executive and Judiciary.

    The PHSO is not any more independent than any other part of Parliament. It is part of Parliament, because it is not the Executive or the Judiciary. It does not have the independence of the Judiciary, who independence is enshrined in the statute of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. This is because I can see nothing similar in the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967. PHSO is not more independent of PACAC. than PACAC is of the HOC Standards Committee.

    As a government minister doesn’t hold parliament to account, as far as I understand it, you would not expect a government minister to hold PHSO to account.

    As PACAC’s decisions can be overruled by the Standards Committee, as far as I understand it, then so can PHSO’s be overruled by PACAC. However, even if that was untrue, they could be asked to look at a case again, as does the Criminal Cases Review Commission.

    Also, I cannot seen how PACAC reconciles this position, with the possibility of the Ombudsman being removed from Office pursuant to the Parliamentary Commissioner Ac t 1967 s1(3)(b). This presumably must be based on individual cases. And while it is executed by both Houses of Parliament and the King, PACAC seems the obvious place to start it.

    So I would like to see that changed to be lawful but cannot get this done in court currently because I cannot get a fair hearing. That is another Unconstitutional rule, which is applied to me.

    Not that I trust the Supreme Court to get it right. This is because they have rewritten the Limitation Act 1980 s32 Postponement of the Limitation Act in case of fraud, concealment or mistake, (1)( c ) the action is relief from the consequences of a mistake. They say this means that mistake has to be an essential ingredient of the cause of action. This was referred to in my Copyright damages claim in the High Court, where Roth J said that as mine was a copyright claim mistake was not an essential ingredient of the cause of action. See Test Claimants in the Franked investment Income Group Litigation v Commissioners of the Inland Revenue and another [2012] UKSC. That reduced my £452m damages to £84m. I was ambushed with this by Roth J at the Hearing. Another Unconstitutional ‘convention. On appeal, to the Court of Appeal, Vos LJ, now MOR, upheld this, and refused me permission to appeal to the Supreme Court..’ Well, to me, for a start, that is clearly irrational. Also, it is per incuriam, being contrary to Dupont Steels Ltd v SIRS [1980], HL. The courts are only supposed to interpret statutes, where necessary, not rewrite them.. So it is contrary to the principle of the Separation of the Powers. So clearly Unconstitutional. Something else I would like to see changed. There was about £32bn, in Advanced Corporation Tax, in dispute, in the Test Claimants case.. Lord Sumption, currently quoted regarding a solution to the Migrants problem, was one of the judges.

    So while I can understand the concern of good conventions being turned into bad ones by the courts, I think there is a much bigger issue of bad ones needing to be made good. This should be done by parliament, in my case, by holding the Intellectual Property Office to account for failing to hold the Judiciary to account (it also included unlawful copyright law decisions) but the signs do not look good.

  2. Grahame Pinnell Avatar
    Grahame Pinnell

    True grist for a moot. Here’s another: does an apple fall to the earth or does the earth fall to the apple? Does convention constitute Law or does Law substantiate convention? Answer (in absence of a written constitution) – both (applies to the apple/Earth example as well): in other words everything that has been done before is acceptable and legal – until it is not. It’s also called ‘making it up as you go’ or ‘fake it until you make it’. Recall, in similar vein, that Referenda/-ums were, by Convention, merely advisory – until they were suddenly binding.

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